Ukraine Day 15 and counting….

When I first sat at Table40 to write I never envisaged a commentary on a European war and I still have no wish to be yet another armchair commentator on a conflict that continues to rain devastation on a major European State.

But: I have a view that I feel I must voice so I guess that is what I am doing as this is the fourth time I have commented and sadly things seem to be following a predictable path;

0 - 72 Hours (First 3 days)

Russia clearly intended a lightning strike to decapitate the Ukrainian government and impose its influence on a largely “willing population”. The window for this was no more than 72 hours and due to what seems to have been a mixture of poor intelligence, under resource and poor execution of the strike by the Russian military and, a totally unexpected, immediate and capable response by the Ukrainian defence forces, the window on this high speed, relatively small scale endeavour to gain a quick "win" closed with failure of the decapitation strike on Kiev and a wider Russian failure to fully achieve any of its objectives on either the north or south axis of attack.

0-100 hours (First 5 days)

Within this time the commited ground support for the initial strike forces could have rescued the Russian position before they hit a logistical wall. Again, Ukrainian resolve and Russian ineptitude in the execution of integrated all arms combat resulted in failure, especially in the northern axis move to secure Kiev.

In the south Russia achieved more success – I suggest as objectives were clearer, the attacks launched from well established existing positions by more battle ready forces deployed from established positions in Crimea and the already occupied disputed territories of Donetsk and Luhansk with the additional benefit of uncontested naval support and logistical resupply making manoeuvre far simpler.

However, in both regions Russian forces seem to have not progressed beyond what are clear logistical constraints – the map below illustrates the current situation (original source here) and the limited advances made

So, where are we now?

Day 0 - Day 15

For both sides logistics and the will to prosecute the fight have proven key. Ukraine has shown huge resolve and its forces the ability to resist and frustrate the Russian incursions. Subject to its ability to maintain the line of supply for the light portable anti armour & air weapons and other munitions and equipment it uses to great effect the Ukrainian choice clearly has been made - they fight on.

Russia has a more complex set of issues;

Firstly it seems clear its forces were not configured for the fight that has developed. If the news feeds are anything like a true picture many of the deployed troops are conscripts using second line kit who were inadequately prepaired and have little stomach for this fight. Witness the large number of seemingly undamaged, abandoned russian fighting vehicles - this simply should not happen to a capable attacking force.

So, two questions;

Question one: How will the Russian forces reconfigure - are the professional troops available to pursue hard extended combat?

It has to be assumed that the answer is "Yes". If the political will maintains then the forces deployed will reconfigure and refocus into a true war fighting force rather than a spearhead force supported by units largley configured for policing a largely uncontested occupation.

Question two: How will Russian forces resolve the clear issues they have with resupply?

This I think is a difficult issue for the Russians to answer in the likely time frames, especially in the North and their attack on Kieiv. Basically, I suggest that in both the Northern and Southern axis of attack Russia continues to find it difficult to operate beyond 100 miles of their secure logistical hubs which at this time remain on Russian, or its client State of Belarus, soil, or in the south, possible costal support by Russian naval assets.

The Russian military has always had an internal dependency on rail for logistical movement and deployment of temporary pipelines for onward transmission of fuels to advanced distribution points but clearly lack both control of meaningful, still operable, rail infrastructure and rolling stock in the occupied areas of Ukraine and a secure territorial hold within which to lay pipe.

This abscence of rail and pipeline requires that the deployed Russian Forces logistical resupply within Ukraine must be by either road or airbridge. The failure of the initial strike on suitable Ukrainian airports and what is reported as their subsequent "decommissioning" by Ukrainian forces seems to have closed the airbridge option and most likely rail has also been “decommissioned“ in the contested and overrun areas as well plus the ground situation seems to prohibt pipe laying; hence road convoy seems the only route for logistical supply. The relatively poor Ukrainian road infrastructure, volumes of movements required and no doubt attacks by Ukrainian forces will all have impeded and hampered resupply by the available road options and the availability of road fuel tankers and purpose built logistical vehicles will incresingly prove fiinite within the constraints of time & distance within which "victory" must be delivered before the geopolitical pressures that are building force either withdrawal or escalation far beyond anything enviaged when the Russians comenced their action on the 24th February.

Also as the weather moves from the sub zero temperatures of the Ukrainian winter the spring thaw will add further complications to the Russian forces supply and manouver abilities - as the Ukrainian countryside floods and the Russian heavy equipment churns both countryside and poor roads to deep mud further inhibiting the Russian forces options for manoeuvre. Just as it has for forces throughout history.

Hence, we come to today and;

Day 15+

Russian forces have started to reconfigure and reverted to their strengths and standard play book of isolating major centres and then using artillery and air to reduce these centres to rubble to break the resistance of the civilian population and force surrender on the opposing forces and executive to end that destruction.

This is clearly the developing situation. Russia has the pure strengh of arms to suceed in this move to "business as usual" of the type witnessed in Georgia, Chechnya and Syria but will it work across a country the physical size of Ukraine and against cities defended by fully mobilised military forces backed by populations counted in hundreds of thousands if not millions?, or will the Russians create a series of Stalingrad’s live beamed around the world?

I suggest this is in Putin’s control. His the only person at this time who can order the prosecution or halt of the assaults. But, I see no easy exit open to him from his commitment to subjugate Ukraine and so the "what now?" question will in large part be decided by the will and ability of the Ukrainian people to resist and the ability of their defence forces to remain viable as Russian attrition of their cities, manpower and equipment intensifies and time passes.

This impasse of will between Putin and the Ukrainian people will take us to the next time barrier which I see as no more than a further 30 days and quite possibly half of ths time. In this time the conflict is likely to remain contained within its current boundries and focused on Ukrainian centers of population.

Whilst NATO and Western States will continue to supply weaponary to Ukraine and America may come to a position to sanction the transfer of MIG fighters to Ukraine by Poland, and possibly other sympathetic operators of Russian types, if public pressure mounts I consider it nearly impossible to see the imposition of a NATO delivered “No fly zone” over Ukraine within this timeline. This is simply not considered a viable option by NATO as such a creation would require the neutralisation of Russian ground based anti-air defences; which are perfectly capable of intercepting aircraft operating over the contested areas of Ukraine from well within the borders of Russia and Belarus. Any NATO strike on such assets would be an attack on sovereign Russian territory and as such represent direct conflict between NATO and Russia which is a risk NATO will not of choice take.

A United Nations sponsored operation of a No Fly mandate is something I would also consider non-starter as Russia holds a veto and China would almost certainly also block such UN armed intervention which would have to be resourced by NATO member states or at the very least from NATO territory .

Just maybe as part of some form of general ceasefire an air security zone could be set over Western Ukraine which is largely beyond current Russian dispositions and the reach of Russian ground based home territory systems? But again this would need a wide international sponsorship - an endorsement by China and possibly India of a UN motion could force a Russian acceptance as a stage in a wider settlement?

Day 30+

I see 30 days as the maximum time Putin can maintain current operations and the direct bombardment of Ukrainian centres in face of Russian logistical and fiscal realities, continuing active Ukrainian resistance and ever growing destruction and civilian deaths been viewed in real time worldwide. If the conflict breaks through 30 days, the prospect of a wider European war must become very real as with the misery and death beamed into their living rooms 24/7 western public opinion could quickly build to the point where it forces Western Governments to act regardless of their professional counsel not to escalate their involvement and, the possible consequences of direct intervention.

At or ideally before this point is reached you can only hope that wise heads in Russia will come to the fore and force a de-escalation as it must be doubtful that Putin will have the personal will or ability to capitulate without first securing major concessions if he is to remain in power.

What about the power of the sanctions imposed to stop Putin?

No doubt the action against Russian banks and freezing of the hard currency reserves of the Russian State are and will have impact. But, the Russian economy is of a size that can, and if necessary over time will, internalise.

Putin still holds cards in the supply of energy resources that the major gas consuming West European players, Germany (49% of supply) , Italy\(46%) , Poland (40%), France (24%) , Netherlands (11%) simply cannot just “turn off” their dependancy on Russian gas without thenselves suffering very serious industrial and social consequences.

The exit from Russa of western corporations such as the social media giants of Apple, Meta, Netflix and TikTok together with the Millennial's fast food icons of McDonalds, KFC and Starbucks, the cesation of trade by western automotive and luxury brands from Russia and sanctions on technology transfer will all impact. But, largely only on a small minority of Russia’s population and industrial capacities. It will be largley felt by the new class of urban millennials that has grown up over the last 25 years.

But they will mean almost nothing to the wider Russian populous living outside the great cities and actually play into Putin’s narrative of “Russia’s oppression” by the aggressor Western Powers.

The fiscal and technical sanctions will undoubtably damage the Russian States ability to conduct fiscal transactions, limit its hard currency access and its ability to raise revenues. The impact of the withdrawal of Western financial service resources; Banking, Visa & MasterCard etc whilst having huge symbolism to the West will likely be moderated by the actions of China who could, likely will, step quietly into the spaces created with bank support and access to payment processing via the likes of UnionPay. The fact is that Russian banks already connect to the UnionPay rails, which in turm connect to some 180 countries, and as others have observed these Banks will likely start issuing cards co-badging Russia's domestic Mir payments system with UnionPay. Once this action is taken it is unlikely that the Visa & MasterCharge platforms will hold much future relevance to Russian consumers and its reasonable to forsee Chinese Firms (i.e. Government) stepping into many of the seats vacated by Western businesses and once seated prove very, very, difficult to unseat at future dates.

Remember that between 1946 and 1989 Russia was to all practical purposes outside the Western financial and commercial eco-structure and it is quite conceivable that this situation could again become fact. Basically, sanctions have value and power but they can never strangle the existence of the Russian State and risk amplifying the narrative of oppression on which Putin bases his position. I repeat my earlier comment that Putin’s internal presentation is based on his objective of rebuilding the Russian sphere of influence and a simple narative built on assumed fact - the fact that he views Russia through a structuralist's lens of Empire, one that has been slighted and that has throughout its history suffered huge loss and deprivations at the hands of others and instinctively sees danger at its borders and legitimate purpose in buffering those borders with client states as a line of defence.

The simple fact is that in the timeline of the likley life of this invasion the imposed sanctions and the losses they impose mean close to nothing when weighed against Putin's narative of historic loss and oppression to either Putin or the bulk of the Russian population, who only have access to Russian media reporting and his narrative. They are not watching Sky News, the BBC, NBC, CNN, etc; nor are they reading the editorial colums and reporting of the Guardian or New York Times. In truth few russians have ever gained personal benefit from any of the sanctioned supplies and goods. An answer and defence to assumed threat, be it real or illusionary, flows from Putin’s narrative of “defensive aggression” and he understands how to project this narrative to his population and the value of both projected and utilised power.

In counterpart to this we in the West seem to live in a bubble of belief that our free and consumer based model of peaceful democracy is the one true way of the world and universally recognised as such.

Sadly, it is not.

In truth it is the exception to historical fact and a creation of America's predominance and will to export its power and impose its commercial strengh over the last 70 years. Below this dominance of the "American way" and its role of world policeman and disaster rescue service the fact is that today some 80% of the world’s countries continue to be ruled by dictatorships or autocrats who hold quite different values. Putin knows this, has seen America waver in its role as the world's policeman and greatest economic powerhouse and playes to the space America's growing introspections over recent years have created. It is worth noting that condemnation of his actions is muted from South America and African States who do not follow the American / European view of democratic freedom and from the coming super power of India who, like China is sitting and watching as the position unfolds.

Whist we in the developed West spend 80% of GDP on health and social care and fret over climate change most of the world’s population simply work to survive with little thought for the niceties we obsess over.

Our major corporations are equally inhibited by this view of what is "good" with many of the manufacturing and employment giants of the mid-20th Century in decline. Witness General Motors of America - who prior to their Chapter 11 bankruptcy were basically reduced by their huge retiree liabilities to the status of a "Not for Profit" health care provider; who also made cars . The replacement corporations of the “new age of technology ”; Meta, Apple and their like produce little of primary value or if they do manufacture tangible goods choose to off shore the actual production of their offerings to low cost of production areas that are basically the non-democratic states they, and we, rile against.

Actual primary products and productions:- mining, oil extraction, iron & steel production, ship building, etc we in Europe again largely offshore, once again often to those states we decry, rather than choosing to produce with our own soverign (expensive) domestic labour and resources.

In many ways the situiation playing out in Ukraine is a litmus of a situation of our own making that has been clearly visible to anyone who cared to look for at least the last decade.

So where are we?

In truth Putin has set out over an extend period his aims and aspirations and it would seem that only a substantial satisfaction of these aims would result in him agreeing cessation of his military actions.

What is his "want list"?

Clearley he requires recognition by the West of the current de facto absorption into the Russian sphere of control, if not the Russian State, of Crimea, the Black Sea coastal region already over run and the territories of Donetsk and Luhansk and, a general disarmarment east of the Dnieper River. This would in effect partition Ukraine in half with Russia taking the South and East of the country. That must be a situation which cannot be accepted by the Ukrainian Government and Population and in all events it would be one that ended badly for the populations so absorbed into Russia's orbit as it would be beyond the financial ability of Russia to make, and more importantly deliver, commitments for the rebuilding of and reinvesting in the horrendously war damaged infrastructures, housing and industries within these geographies - commitments that would be on a scale not seen since the years following the end of World War 2 and the Marshall Plan.

It seems most likely that the reality will be that these demands will scale back to recognition of Russia's absorption of Crimea and acceptance of the "independence" of the areas of Donetsk and Luhansk lost to Ukraine in 2014. As these areas are clearly already broken from the Ukrainian State and in majority ethnic Russian this would seem a likely and possible compromise.

Putin's other core demand:- that Ukraine does not join the EU or NATO ,could also very likely be acceptably fudged given the time that any such integrations would take and the simple inability of the current EU Member States to take on the cost of integrating Ukraine into membership.

Remember only 9 EU Members actually make a positive balance contribution to the EU's finances and of those 9 Germany represents some 33% of the total and France 15% (2018 figures ) within these exibited values the UK was still a contributing member; the second largest net contributor after Germany @ some 18.5%. The UK contribution is now lost to the EU and it will fall largley on Germany, France and the Nordic Members to make good this large loss - a reasonable question to ask is;

"How much of the fiscal burden of the EU the populations of these countries tolerate"?

When the maths are presented can the EU actually afford early membership of a Ukrainian State that has been ravaged by war?

What is now necessary and what could the end game look like?,

An acceptance of regional amputation and strictures on Ukraine's ambitions within the EU and NATO must be the likely core of any negotiated end game and I suggest we in the West are facing some very big questions and choices in deciding what actually goes into the envelope of any agreement:

On a global scale we in the West must choose;

• to accept, protect and care for all Ukrainians who have fled the conflict

• maintain support for the continued resistance within Ukraine

• to re assess our attitude to engergy security and manufacturing and cease or at least drastically reduce dependance on energy from Russia and other areas that show instability or a potential conflict of objectives.

• all of Western Europe must re-assess its spending on and commitment to defence - here NATO must remain the unfied core and the central value of the American commitment must be fully acknowledged and maintained and the European members must step up their defence spending.

• America must retain its commitment and guarantee to NATO and Europe

• if Putin's adventure results in a regime change in Russia: to make every effort to build back relations and draw Russia back towards our values and a state of engagement and open participation - an opportunity that was badly squandered in the 1990's post the disolution of the USSR

With regard to the future of Ukraine:

Like it or not It is necessay to recognise that history has a story to tell us; for most of written history what is now the Ukrainian State has been disputed territory; a land and people located between competing empires. The word “Ukraine” basically translates to “Borderland”.

The history of conflict and competition for this “Borderland” is long and complex. The Mongol, Otterman, Lithuanian and Polish Empires all contested and occupied its territory in whole or part before the Russian Imperial Empire entered the contest for control in the 18th Century.

1917 and the end of World War 1 saw a brief creation of an independent Ukrainian State which was then extinguished, by the Soviets in 1921. Thereafter Ukraine existed within the structure of the USSR until the USSR’s disintegration. The shell of modern Ukraine has existed as a unified state for no more than seventy years (as a member republic of the USSR and so vassal state of Russia) and thereafter as a truly free standing independent state for little more than a further thirty years.

In short , be it uncomfortable or not, Putin’s version of history has a validity in its assertion that “todays Ukraine” is a construct largley of Russia's making and his invasion of Ukraine brings to sharp focus choices that we in the West must make as to our view of Russia's (Not necessary the same as Putin's) concerns and Ukraine's future existance;

• will we defend our values and way of life or, will we allow those values to have sharply drawn borders that are defined by others under threat of conflict - others who hold very different values and priorities to us?

• are we willing to recognise and stand firm in face of such threats of war?

• when making the choice: on what side of the "border" will we enable Ukraine to exist?,

• is Ukraine to be accepted as a free and independent country aspiring to become what we can recognise as a functioning democracy and if so are we (Western Europe and the USA & Canada) willing to meet the huge costs and commitments of is acceptance into our sphere and fully support its rebuilding and protection? or,

• is Ukraine to remain “Borderland” with its cities and infrastructure left in a state of devistation and its land a proxi battlefield contested between de facto empires?

I see only one choice - for the West to protect and underwrite the recovery and development of a reconstituted but firmly independant Ukrainian State.

But in doing this to accept, as regretfully must the Ukrainian people, that this State will for the forseeable future exist outside membership of the EU and NATO and without the Russian held regions of Donetsk and Luhansk and certainly without Crimea.

The alternative is an esculating conflict that sooner rather than later would spill beyond the boundaries of Ukraine and become an escalating and ultimatly direct kenitic engagement between Russian and NATO forces from which true Armageddon could envelop us all ….